Abstract-Device-to-device (D2D) communication raises new transmission secrecy protection challenges, since conventional physical layer security approaches, such as multiple antennas and cooperation techniques, are invalid due to its resource/size constraints. The full-duplex (FD) jamming receiver, which radiates jamming signals to confuse eavesdroppers when receiving the desired signal simultaneously, is a promising candidate. Unlike existing endeavors that assume the FD jamming receiver always improves the secrecy performance compared with the half-duplex (HD) receiver, we show that this assumption highly depends on the instantaneous residual self-interference cancellation level and may be invalid. We propose an adaptive jamming receiver operating in a switched FD/HD mode for a D2D link in random networks. Subject to the secrecy outage probability constraint, we optimize the transceiver parameters, such as signal/jamming powers, secrecy rates, and mode switch criteria, to maximize the secrecy throughput. Most of the optimization operations are taken off-line and only very limited on-line calculations are required to make the scheme with low complexity. Furthermore, some interesting insights are provided, such as the secrecy throughput is a quasi-concave function. Numerical results are demonstrated to verify our theoretical findings, and to show its superiority compared with the receiver operating in the FD or HD mode only.
ensure that the equivalent channel of the legitimate receiver is "better" than that of the eavesdropper, to guarantee a positive secrecy capacity. Following this idea, two promising approaches, i.e., multiple-antenna technologies and cooperation/relay technologies, have been widely adopted to achieve this goal, such as multi-antenna beamforming [5] , [6] , artificial noise assisted methods [7] , [8] , cooperative beamforming [9] , [10] , cooperative jamming [11] , [12] , and some hybird schemes [13] , [14] . However, in many scenarios, multiple antennas are unavailable due to the size and complexity constraints of the transmitter, and cooperative schemes (related to node mobility, synchronization and trustworthiness [15] [16] [17] ) are also overhead-demanding due to their distributed feature. Device-to-device (D2D) communication in Internet of Things (IoT) applications is such a typical scenario [18] [19] [20] , where D2D pairs, such as sensors, are usually equipped with a single antenna each and could not cooperation. In these scenarios, the proposed schemes employing multiple antennas or cooperation no longer apply. Thus, protecting information from leakage still remains challenging in the physical layer.
Fortunately, the progress of developing full duplex (FD) radios opens a new window in the aforementioned scenarios [21] [22] [23] . The critical challenge in implementing such an FD node is the presence of self-interference (SI) that leaks from the FD node's output to its input. Owing to the evolution of SI cancelation techniques, SI can be suppressed in the spacial domain [24] , digital circuit domain [25] and analogy circuit domain [26] , respectively. 1 The receiver of a D2D pair, a data collector for example, can predominantly improve the security of the communication link by simultaneously sending a jamming signal when receiving the confidential signal from the transmitter. The jamming signal is able to disturb the eavesdropper from wiretapping while it can be eliminated by the SI procedure at the FD receiver itself. In such a way, physical layer secrecy performance is improved. We refer to this idea as the FD jamming receiver in this paper. As the FD transceiver becomes implementation practical, the FD jamming receiver scheme turns to be an alternative physical layer security approach for D2D applications.
The FD jamming receiver has already been reported and discussed from secrecy metrics [27] , [28] , resource allocations [29] [30] [31] , and transmission designs [32] [33] [34] [35] , etc. Among these endeavors, only [27] and [31] have focused on the single-antennax scenario and could be applied in D2D communications with resource/size constraints. However, the assumption that the instantaneous channel state information (ICSI) of a wiretap channel is perfectly known by legitimate nodes in [31] is difficult to realize, since the eavesdropper is usually passive. Furthermore, the works mentioned above ignore the scenarios in the presence of multiple malicious eavesdroppers.
When multiple eavesdroppers exist, the secrecy performance strongly relies on the randomly spatial positions of the eavesdroppers and the propagation large-scale path losses. By utilizing the framework of stochastic geometry theory and Poisson point process (PPP) [38] [39] [40] , studies on physical layer security with the FD jamming receiver against random eavesdroppers have been carried out in [41] and [42] . The analysis of network-wide secrecy performance, such as the area secure link number and the network secrecy throughput, have been focused on in [41] and [42] , where no specific secure transmission scheme has been proposed.
All of the above investigations made a fundamental assumption by default, that the FD jamming receiver improves the secrecy performance unconditionally compared with the conventional HD receiver. However, we point out that this conclusion actually highly depends on the efficiency of the SI suppression, i.e., the value of the instantaneous SI channel gain. We note that the instantaneous SI channel is usually modeled as a Nakagami-m [23] , [43] , Rayleigh [24] , [44] , or Ricean [26] , [45] random variable. With a high SI channel gain, the residual SI at the receiver is probably larger than jamming signals received at the eavesdroppers after a large scale fading of the wiretap channels. In such a situation, the overall effect of FD jamming is negative to the secrecy performance, and the receiver in a half-duplex (HD) mode is better than it in an FD mode. It implies that an adaptive FD jamming receiver should be utilized according to the SI cancelation level, i.e., the receiver will adaptively switch between an FD mode (transmit jamming when receiving signal) and an HD mode (stop transmitting jamming) . It will obviously outperform the existing pure FD jamming strategy.
Furthermore, for a D2D transmitter with limited hardware and power resources, a full adaptive receiver with on-line transmission parameter optimization ability according to all ICSIs is very difficult with on board calculation ability, if not impossible. Therefore, a low complexity adaptive FD jamming scheme is an interesting and effective approach to improve the secrecy of a D2D link, which motivates this work. To the best of our knowledge, no prior work has considered this.
A. Our Work and Contributions
In this paper, we propose a low complexity adaptive jamming receiver operating in a switched FD/HD mode according to the instantaneous residual SI channel gain for a D2D link, coexisting with PPP distributed random eavesdroppers. The novelty and main contributions of this paper can be summarized as follows: 1) For the first time, we propose an adaptive switched FD/HD jamming receiver secure strategy according to the residual SI channel gain. We optimize a threshold as the mode switch criteria, and design transmission schemes for each mode with the low complexity constraints of D2D nodes under consideration. 2) In both modes, the optimal transceiver parameters, such as the signal power, secrecy rates, and jamming power, to maximize the secrecy throughput under the secrecy outage probability (SOP) constraint is optimized off-line. Only very limited calculation should be taken on-line to keep computational complexity low. Explicit optimization solutions to the two cases are provided. 3) We provide new insights into the secure transmission design in both modes. Numerical results show that the secrecy throughput of the proposed strategy is superior to those of schemes with a single receiver mode each.
B. Organization and Notations
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section II, we present the system model and propose an adaptive switched FD/HD jamming receiver secure strategy. In Section III, we provide the SOP. In Section IV, we solve optimization problems of secrecy throughput maximization under the SOP constraint for each mode. In Section V, we design an adaptive switched FD/HD jamming receiver transmission scheme with off-line and on-line parts. Numerical results are presented in Section VI, and Section VII concludes our work.
We use the following notations in this paper: P {·}, F v (·) and E v [·] denote probability, the cumulative distribution function (CDF) of v and the mathematical expectation with respect to (w.r.t.) v, respectively. CN μ, σ 2 and exp (λ) denote the circularly symmetric complex Gaussian distribution with mean μ and variance σ 2 , and the exponential distribution with parameter λ, respectively. |·| and Γ (·) denote Euclidean norm and gamma function, respectively. log 2 (·) and ln (·) denote base-2 and natural logarithms, respectively. (·) * ,(·) † and (·) represent the optimal solutions. ∼ stands for "distributed as".
II. SYSTEM MODEL AND PROBLEM FORMULATION

A. System Model
Consider a D2D communication pair depicted in Fig. 1 , where a single-antenna transmitter (Alice) delivers confidential information to a single-antenna legitimate receiver (Bob), in the presence of spatially randomly located passive eavesdroppers (Eves). Each of Eves is also equipped with a single antenna. Without loss of generality, we locate Alice at (0, 0) and Bob at (d AB , 0) in polar coordinates as shown in Fig. 1(b) . We model the positions of Eves, e k : (d Ak , θ k ) ∈ R 2 , as a homogeneous PPP Φ of intensity λ e . The distance between Bob and the k-th Eve, d Bk , satisfies d
For FD Bob, it has the ability to transmit a jamming signal to degrade the quality of the wiretap links while simultaneously receiving the desired signal. The FD mode leads to a feedback loop channel from Bob's output to its input through the channel √ ρh BB shown in Fig. 1(a) , where ρ ∈ [0, 1] models the effect of SI suppression in the spacial domain [22] , [32] and h BB represents the SI channel fading. The value of ρ corresponds to different SI suppression levels, where ρ = 0 refers to perfect SI suppression and ρ = 1 means no SI suppression. We will show that the SI suppression level affects the secrecy performance of the FD jamming receiver significantly, i.e., FD mode Bob is not always beneficial to the system security compared with HD mode Bob. To prevent SI from covering the desired signal, Bob switches to operate in the HD mode, i.e., to stop transmit jamming, when the residual SI channel gain is still sufficiently large. Let h AB denote the channel fading between Alice and Bob. h Ak and h Bk denote the channel fading from Alice and Bob to the k-th Eve, respectively. All of the wireless channels undergo quasi-static Rayleigh fading, and h AB , h BB , h Ak and h Bk are independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) with zero mean and unit variance [24] , [25] , i.e., obeying CN (0, 1). The legitimate channel, the wiretap channels and the jamming channels are assumed to suffer from large scale path losses governed by an exponent α ≥ 2. In addition, we assume that the ICSI of Bob is perfectly known by Alice, and the channel state distribution information (CSDI) of Eves is available. 2 The signal received at Bob and the k-th Eve can be expressed by 2 These assumptions are generic in literature on physical layer security, as referred to [41] and [42] .
domain [46] , [47] .
represent the noise at Bob and the k-th Eve, respectively.
We consider a wiretap scenario where non-colluding Eves individually decode messages. Hence, the wiretap channel capacity depends on the Eve with the strongest wiretap channel. The capacities of the main channel and of the wiretap channels are then calculated as 
B. Secure Transmission Scheme
The well-known Wyner's wiretap encoding scheme is utilized with the codeword rate R C and the secrecy rate R S . If the main channel can support R C , i.e., C B ≥ R C , Bob can recover the secret message, and the connection is reliable. If the capacity of the wiretap channels, C E , exceeds the redundant rate R C − R S , perfect secrecy is compromised, and a secrecy outage event occurs.
To avoid an undesired connection outage, i.e., C B < R C , or an intolerable high secrecy outage, i.e., C E ≥ R C − R S , we propose the on-off transmission strategy for Alice. Alice transmits only when γ AB is not below a preset threshold μ A , otherwise it keeps silent. Specifically, the transmit power P A at Alice is adjusted based on γ AB and γ BB for an FD Bob, and only varies with γ AB for HD Bob. We will see that this transmit scheme is with very low complexity.
For FD Bob, the introduction of the jamming signal tends to reduce C E to enhance the secrecy. When the residual SI channel gain is large, however, the jamming signal leads to more SI than interference to Eves, and Bob is expected to operate in the HD mode. Therefore, we adopt a secure transmission scheme with adaptive switched FD/HD Bob to further safeguard the security. Bob switches between in the FD and HD mode according to the residual SI, i.e., ργ BB . When ργ BB is sufficiently small, such as ργ BB = 0, FD Bob can efficiently interfere with Eves while suffering little SI. With the increasing ργ BB , however, the SI of the FD Bob rises while the jamming to Eves stays unchanged for realization of channels γ AB , γ Ak and γ Bk . When ργ BB is large enough, Bob is expected to work in the HD mode to protect the confidential signal against SI. Therefore, a threshold μ B of ργ BB exists, where Bob operates in the FD mode when ργ BB < μ B and in the HD mode when ργ BB ≥ μ B .
For a given μ B , we thus have two groups of parameters, i.e., R Remark 1: The proposed scheme adopts a fixed P B for the FD mode rather than adjustable w.r.t. the ICSIs γ AB and γ BB . Since in the latter case, the accurate optimum solutions to the above two groups of parameters are hard to obtain and they should be solved numerically on-line at any channel realization of γ AB and γ BB , which seems impractical for a D2D communication pair.
and μ B can be optimized and obtained off-line, which will be shown in the following sections. This greatly reduces the complexity and enhances the operability of our proposed switched FD/HD mode receiver secure strategy.
C. Performance Metrics
The SOP 3 for a given γ AB is defined as
To evaluate the average secrecy transmission capacity, we define the secrecy throughput with the fixed R S as
where
are the transmission probability of the On-Off scheme, and the conditional connection probability, respectively.
In the following, we optimize the switched FD/HD Bob to maximize the secrecy throughput under the SOP constraint. We start with the analysis of the SOP.
III. SECRECY OUTAGE PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS
We evaluate the SOP and derive a closed-form approximated expression for the SOP in this section. We first give the CDF of the SINR ϕ E of the equivalent wiretap channel in the following lemma, which would be extensively used in subsequent discussions.
Lemma 1: The CDF of ϕ E is given by
Proof: Please see Appendix A. Owing to the double integrals where d Bk is a function of d Ak and θ k in (7), it is not easy to obtain compact expressions for F ϕE and the SOP P so related to F ϕE . Note that, to guarantee a reliable communication and to prevent Alice from being overheard, the distance between a D2D pair, d AB , is usually small in most applications, such as 0 − 0.2m in Near Field Communications (NFC) systems, 0 − 10m in Ultra-wideband (UWB) systems, and 0 − 30m in ZigBee and Bluetooth systems [20] , [48] . Therefore, we resort to an asymptotic analysis by considering a small d AB regime as referred to [41] and provide a concise approximation for F ϕE , which facilitates the analysis of P so as follows. (7) is approximated by
α and substituting
where ( Based on results in Lemma 1 and Lemma 2, we can obtain both theoretical and approximate expressions for the SOP considering a small regime of d AB in the following theorem.
Theorem 1: The theoretical expression for the SOP is written as
and its approximation in a small d AB regime with a closed form is expressed by
Proof: The results can be easily obtained by plugging the CDF F ϕE in (7) and the approximation of the CDF in (8) into (5), respectively.
We can analyze the relationship between P so and λ e , R C , R S , P A , P B through either (9) or (10) . We find that secrecy outage events less likely occur when enhancing R C − R S and P B , or reducing λ e and P A . To illustrate the validity of the given approximation method and further to show that the approximation stays accurate even for quite a wide range of d AB , we compare the theoretical SOP in (9) and the approximate SOP in (10) as shown in Fig. 2 . The figure shows that in a wide range of λ e with different orders of magnitude, the theoretical SOP calculated by d AB almost the same as the approximate SOP.
IV. THROUGHPUT-OPTIMAL PARAMETER DESIGN
In previous sections, we have analyzed the secrecy outage. Next, we aim to maximize the overall secrecy throughput subject to the SOP constraint with switched FD/HD Bob. The overall secrecy throughput is the sum of both modes. When Bob operates in the FD mode, we adopt a group of fixed R (γ AB ). P Amax and P Bmax are denoted as the maximum transmit power of Alice and Bob, respectively. The optimization problem is formulated as
where (11b), (11c), and (11d) represent the constraints for secrecy outage, reliable connection, power budgets of Alice and Bob, respectively. Owing to the reliable connection constraints, i.e., (11c), the secrecy throughput in (6) is transformed into Ω s = R S P {γ AB ≥ μ A }. Considering the switched FD/HD mode receiver secure strategy, we thus have the concise forms of Ω F D and Ω HD as
where (b) and (c) follow from γ AB ∼ exp (1) and γ BB ∼ exp (1), respectively. We notice that Ω s is a function w.r.t. μ and P B due to the SOP and reliable connection constraints. Therefore, the objective function (11a) of the optimization problem is provided as
For a given operation mode switch threshold μ B , the optimization problem in the HD mode can be treated as a special case of that in the FD mode with P B = 0. Therefore, we only need to solve the optimization problem in the latter situation, and the optimal solutions of the former situation can be obtained directly. In this section, we perform the optimization procedure step by step for a given μ B . The optimum μ B is solved in the next section.
For ease of notation, we omit 
Therefore, the entire optimization procedure can be decomposed into two steps: We maximizeΩ by first optimizing over R C , R S , μ A and P A for a given P B , and then further maximizing the result over the remaining variable P B .
A. 
SinceΩ in (16a) is a function w.r.t. R S and μ A , which are further coupled with R C and P A due to the constraints (16b) and (16c), the problem seems difficult to solve. Treating μ A as a function w.r.t. R C and R S , i.e., μ A (R C , R S ), we first consider (16c), (16d) and obtain the expression for P A (γ AB , γ BB ). Then, we analyze (16b) according to P A (γ AB , γ BB ). We will show that the constraints in problem (16) will be transformed into an explicit constraint of
Owing to (16c), we know that to achieve a large R S , R C is accordingly adjusted to its maximum value, i.e.,
. Therefore, we obtain an expression for P A under γ AB , γ BB , R C and R S :
Moreover, with (17) and (16d), the feasible range of P A (γ AB , γ BB , R C , R S ) can be expressed by
Hence, the transmission is valid only when
On the other hand, by plugging P A (γ AB , γ BB , R C , R S ) in (17) into (16b), the SOP is (20) where 
where τ
and we obtain
So far, we have obtained two threshold constraints of μ A , i.e., (19) and (23) . Recalling the objective function (16a), to achieve a largeΩ, we expect a small enough (19) and (23) . We discuss the two different values, μ A1 (R C ) and μ A2 (R C , R S ), and obtain a result in the following proposition.
Proposition 1:
Proof: Please see Appendix B. With this conclusion, the constraints (16b)-(16e) are equivalent to (24) . From (24), we have
By plugging the threshold in (19) or (23) into (16a) and defining
According to (26b), Z can be treated as a function w.r.t. Y , i.e., Z (Y ). Thus, the problem (26) is simplified as a single variable sub-optimization problem:
AlthoughΩ appears in an implicit function of Y , we can still prove that it is quasi-concave on Y , and provide the solution to the problem (27) in the following theorem.
Theorem 2: Given a P B , the secrecy throughputΩ in (27) is a quasi-concave function [50] of Y , and the optimum Y * that maximizesΩ is the unique root of the following equation:
where 
The following theorem provides the optimum P † B that maximizesΩ * . Theorem 3: The secrecy throughputΩ * in (30a) is a quasiconcave function of P B , and the optimum P † B that maximizes Ω * is
where P * B is the unique root of the following equation:
and 
and
Considering (33), the first-order derivative ofΩ * w.r.t. P B from (30a) is provided as 
Clearly, the sign of 
Considering the expression for V (Y * ) in (29), we have Y * > V (Y * ) and
x − 1 with x ≥ 1, the following equivalent transformation holds:
Thus,
Combining (36) and (37), (39), we have 
C. HD Case
For HD Bob, considering the secrecy throughput in (13), the optimization problem (11) 
Through a similar process as Step 1, we obtain the optimum R HD * C as follows. Corollary 3: The optimum R
HD * C
for HD Bob is the unique root of equation:
Proof: Substituting P B = 0 into (28) end if 10: end for 11: Plug R , μ
V. ADAPTIVE SWITCHED FD/HD RECEIVER SCHEME So far we have obtained the optimum solutions when Bob works in the FD or HD mode for a given μ B , and the rest work of (14) is to calculate the optimum mode switch threshold μ B . The optimization problem to maximize Ω s becomes a single variable optimization problem, which is formulated as
Considering that both (28) and (32) denote the step size and the maximum value of μ B and P Bstep determines the step size of P B . We have to emphasize that all these parameters can be optimized off-line, and are fixed on-line except P . In Algorithm 2, we provide all the on-line operations of the proposed scheme, which consists of selecting the duplex modes and calculating the powers P 
B. Metrics for Comparison
To verify that the secrecy transmission scheme with a switched FD/HD receiver is superior to which only using an HD or FD receiver, we consider the following metrics.
We denote the secrecy throughputs for FD and HD modes when ργ BB ≤ μ B as
for fair comparisons. We further compare the probability of Bob operating in the FD case and in the HD case for our proposed scheme, which are defined as
In the next section, {Ω P Amax is sufficiently large, Ω * HD reaches a plateau since there is a balance between the reliable connection probability and the secrecy outage probability. Fig. 4(a) . Fig. 4(b) shows that the maximum secrecy throughput first increases w.r.t. P Bmax since the jamming signal confuses Eves effectively. When SI is gradually dominant with the growth of P Bmax , a certain P Bmax exists to balance the impact of SI and jamming to Eves and Ω † F D then stays unchanged. depends on P Amax . We should note that the least P B is predefined as −10dBm in the above comparison, or otherwise the optimum P B is equal to zero for sufficiently large μ B or sufficiently small P Amax and thus the FD mode degenerates into the HD mode. Fig. 6 plots the maximum secrecy throughputs for the almost FD Bob, almost HD Bob, and switched FD/HD Bob all solved from our proposed scheme versus P Amax for different values of . Obviously, the secrecy throughput with switched FD/HD Bob is always larger than the ones for FD and HD Bob. We should note that with μ B = −40dBm and ρ = −70dBm, i.e., γ BB ≤ 10 3 , Bob almost only operates in the FD mode considering γ BB distributed as exp (1) . On the other hand, with μ B = −100dBm and ρ = −70dBm, Bob almost operates in the HD mode only. Fig. 7 illustrates the probability of Bob operating in the FD mode P F D solved from (45) and in the HD mode P HD solved from (46) of our proposed transmission scheme change with ρ for different values of . In accordance with the former analysis, P F D decreases with a worse suppression level of SI, while P HD is totally opposite. Moreover, P F D decreases and P HD increases w.r.t. . Fig. 8 interprets how the maximum secrecy throughput Ω s changes with P Amax and P Bmax for different values of and ρ. Ω s decreases with increasing ρ since the secrecy performance is damaged by badly suppressed SI. As shown in Fig. 8(a) , when P Amax grows, Ω s increases until it approaches a static value. Furthermore, the minimum P Amax at which Ω s stays unchanged (turning point) depends on the larger one between the two turning points' P Amax of the secrecy throughput for FD and HD Bob, respectively, since the ones of Ω † F D and Ω * HD are irrelevant to μ B seen from Fig. 5 . As shown in Fig. 8(b) , Ω s increases until it approaches a static value with the growth of P Bmax . Moreover, P Bmax of Ω s 's turning point is practically the same as the one of Ω † F D , since P Bmax is irrelevant to μ B and P Bmax has no impact on the secrecy performance for HD Bob. Therefore, to enhance the secrecy throughput, we are inspired to rationally relax upper bound of SOP or to expand power budgets of Alice and Bob.
B. Secrecy Throughput Optimization with FD Receiver
C. Maximum Secrecy Throughput with Switched FD/HD Receiver
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have provided a low complexity adaptive D2D secure transmission scheme with a switched FD/HD mode jamming receiver, according to the ICSIs of the main link and residual SI link, against PPP randomly distributed eavesdroppers. Two groups of optimized transceiver parameters for the FD and HD receiver, respectively, and the optimum adaptive mode switch threshold to maximize the secrecy throughput under the SOP constraint, have been obtained. The algorithm is consisted of the off-line and on-line parts, and the computational complexity of the on-line operations is low. Simulation results show that the secrecy throughput increases with the growth of budgets of transmit power and jamming power respectively, until it monotonically reaches a plateau. This indicates an existing balance between the reliable connection probability and the SOP. Numerical comparisons on the secrecy throughput verify the superiority of the proposed switched FD/HD mode receiver over an FD or HD mode receiver. Moreover, the secrecy throughput would be enhanced with a larger suppression level of SI, sparser eavesdroppers or a less rigorous SOP constraint.
APPENDIX A PROOF OF LEMMA 1
Considering the SINR ϕ E of (4), we have
where (d) and (e) follow from γ Ak ∼ exp (1) and γ Bk ∼ exp (1), respectively, and (f ) holds for the probability generating functional lemma (PGFL) over PPP [51] .
APPENDIX B PROOF OF PROPOSITION 1 (23) . Combining with μ A1 (R C ) in (19), we then obtain the following inequality
and the objective function in (16a) is transformed intõ
Obviously,Ω in (49) is a decreasing function of R C . To have a small R C , the left-hand side of (48) is set to its maximum value τ , which refers to G μ A1 (R C ) , μB ρ , R C , R S = τ , i.e., μ A1 (R C ) = μ A2 (R C , R S ) from (23).
Case 2: If μ A1 (R C ) ≤ μ A2 (R C , R S ), we can obtain G μ A1 (R C ) , μB ρ , R C , R S ≥ τ from (23) . Combining with μ A1 (R C ) in (19), we then obtain the inequality
The objective function (16a) combining with μ A2 (R C , R S ) in (23) is expressed bỹ
We thus develop the relationship betweenΩ and R C . The partial derivative ofΩ w.r.t. R C is
Clearly,
∂Ω ∂RC
> 0 andΩ increases w.r.t. R C . As a result, R C is expected to be large enough. The lefthand side of (50) is set to its minimum value τ , which means G μ A1 (R C ), μB ρ , R C , R S = τ , i.e., μ A1 (R C ) = μ A2 (R C , R S ) from (23) .
Through discussions of the two cases, we obtain equations in (24) . The proof is completed. 
The second-order derivative ofΩ w.r. > 0, the left side of (28) decreases with R * C with the other variables unchanged. When decreases or λ e increases, the left side of (28) needs reducing, i.e., enhancing R * C , to ensure the equality. We thus obtain the relationships between R * C and , λ e . From (30a), we find that the maximumΩ * for a given P B decreases with increasing R * C . Therefore,Ω * increases with increasing or decreasing λ e . 2) Relationship between R * C ,Ω * and P Amax : Since τ is independent of P Amax , P Amax increases to ensure the equation (28) 
